Surveillance and protection. Lessons from three security situations

The protection of people subject to a serious threat calls for an appropriate approach

The Surveillance and Protection system requires better preparedness and equipping to face up to the threat represented by serious organized crime. The standard approach is unequal to the challenges of assessing this threat and reaching decisions on security measures. In dealing with threats of this kind, better safeguards must be provided in support of the task of surveillance and protection. These are the conclusions of the Dutch Safety Board in the report ‘Surveillance and Protection. Lessons learned from three security situations’, presented today in response to the attacks on Reduan, Derk Wiersum and Peter R. de Vries, respectively the brother, the then lawyer and the confidential advisor to the key witness in the Marengo Trial.

Attacks on three lives

The attacks took place between 2018 and 2021. On 29 March 2018, Reduan was shot and killed at his business in Amsterdam-Noord. On 18 September 2019, Derk Wiersum was shot and killed in his street in Amsterdam. On 6 July 2021, Peter R. de Vries was shot while walking towards his car following the broadcast of the Dutch TV entertainment show RTL Boulevard. De Vries died as a result of injuries sustained, more than a week later. First and foremost, these attacks resulted in immense and irreparable suffering among their next of kin. The attacks also resulted in a feeling of unsafety among the next of kin of the victims, and more broadly within society.

The Surveillance and Protection system was aware of a threat against all three victims, because according to the Public Prosecution Service (OM) and the police, all three were under threat from the same criminal organisation. Reduan insisted on protection for members of his family. When the attack on his life took place, no specific security measures had yet been taken for him. However, an agreement was in place that any report relating to his home or work address would be dealt with by the police with high priority. This same measure was taken for the home and work addresses of Derk Wiersum and Peter R. de Vries. At the home of Derk Wiersum, security measures were taken and there was police surveillance. Peter R. de Vries was not willing to share his schedule to make it possible to organize surveillance for his arrivals and departures. He also made no use of the option to personally notify any high-risk moments. There was police surveillance around his home.

Special duty of care

No one, including the government, is able to guarantee absolute safety. Personal protection is aimed at mitigating risks. This takes place within the Surveillance and Protection system. The Public Prosecution Service, the police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security work according to fixed procedures for mapping out potential threats. The Surveillance and Protection system is required to deal with various types of threat, from terrorist threats to stalking. In the security situations investigated, according to the information available to the Public Prosecution Service and the police, the threat originated from serious organized crime. The threat was extended to include the next of kin of the key witness, because he himself was an almost unattainable target. For the government, this created a special duty of care for the security of these individuals, because of the additional risk to their safety as a result of the key witness deal.

Separate worlds

In the security situations investigated, command of the surveillance and protection of the persons under threat was fragmented across national and regional organisations. Surveillance and Protection did not receive all the information about the threat that was available to the investigation. They were also not always involved in decisions taken in relation to the investigation. This was the consequence of separate worlds within the Public Prosecution Service as well as the police. The different tasks within these worlds (i.e., surveillance and protection on the one hand and investigation and prosecution on the other) cause a dilemma with regard to the sharing of information. The shielding of information can lead to risks to individuals who should be protected, while sharing that information can lead to problems for the investigation and prosecution or to new unsafe situations if the information is leaked. Signals from the threatened individuals were not seen as concrete threat information and as such had no place in the traditional threat assessment system. Substantive differences of opinion escalated into a disturbed relationship between the government and the relatives of the key witness and Peter R. de Vries. The ever declining sense of mutual trust formed an obstacle to information sharing and cooperation in the efforts to find an appropriate solution amenable to all parties.

Recommendations

1. To the Minister of Justice and Security:

Establish a statutory basis for the Surveillance and Protection system so that it can be called upon by the persons to be protected, their employers and the government. At least lay down the following:

a. the frameworks for the Surveillance and Protection system, both substantive and procedural;

b. the rights and obligations of the persons to be protected and their employers;

c. providing access to the parties concerned to an independent appeal body within the Surveillance and Protection system.

2. To the Minister of Justice and Security:

In the face of a threat against individual persons originating from serious organized crime, place responsibility for Surveillance and Protection as a core task at the national level to ensure that:

a. Surveillance and Protection has access to the information necessary for the Surveillance and Protection system, from the investigation, intelligence and security services;

b. the officers responsible for Surveillance and Protection have no tasks that interfere with their operations, enabling them to focus on their Surveillance and Protection task and to gain experience with the complex nature of threats of this kind;

Equip the officers in authority, granting them the powers to gather information (or to order it to be gathered), specifically for Surveillance and Protection tasks.

3. To the Public Prosecution Service, the police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security:

Regard Surveillance and Protection and investigation and prosecution as complementary tasks in combatting serious organized crime (and threats originating from this source), and define the shared challenge in this approach. Translate this shared challenge into a form of cooperation at the operational level, in which information sharing, coordination and the joint balancing of interests between Surveillance and Protection and investigation and prosecution are established, on the basis of equal partnership. At the minimum, give due consideration to the principles and requirements for addressing the dilemma between the sharing and the shielding of information, such that information essential for Surveillance and Protection is made available to the system, and that sensitive information does not end up with those that do not need it.

4. To the Public Prosecution Service, the police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security:

Reinforce the information provision and advisory branch of the Surveillance and Protection system, specifically to arrive at an appropriate response framework in the face of a (conceivable) threat from serious organized crime.

a. Use this process of reinforcement to make it possible to base the protection measures on an integrated assessment of the risks in which soft information and even the absence of information can be interpreted, rather than on a separate threat assessment and a set of recommended measures. Under all circumstances, in the appropriate context, evaluate the threat, the resistance of the person to be protected, the required measures and their effectiveness, and the risks (residual or otherwise).

b. Ensure that all information on the basis of which decisions are taken, assumptions are made and actions initiated, is monitored and evaluated at regular intervals. In that process, make structural use of scenario analysis and opposing opinions.

5. To the Public Prosecution Service, the police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security:

Actively live up to the special responsibility of the government to ensure that differences in factual perspectives do not develop into interpersonal conflicts, but instead are used to arrive at a common, appropriate solution. Further increase the awareness of Surveillance and Protection officers of this task and provide them with the necessary support in the form of specific training and counselling. As an organization, ensure to anticipate the risk of interpersonal conflicts arising, and identify methods for dealing with that risk.

6. To the Public Prosecution Service:

Right from the start of a possible key witness process, ensure a structured approach to assessing:

a. from the viewpoint of investigation and prosecution: The criminal procedural interest of the use of the key witness;

b. from the viewpoint of Surveillance and Protection and Witness Protection: The risks that face the key witness and their environment, the security measures that are necessary to manage these risks, and the possibilities within Surveillance and Protection and Witness Protection to provide those measures.

Use this assessment as the basis for a carefully considered balancing of the common interests of Surveillance and Protection, and investigation and prosecution while coming to a decision on whether or not to make use of a key witness. If this results in the decision to use a key witness, ensure that the necessary security measures for the key witness and their environment are operational at the moment when the key witness deal is made public.

7. To the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security:

As the authority with system responsibility, ensure that protection situations are structurally evaluated, making use of past experience, best practices and lessons learned to improve the system. In that process, ensure that:

a. the parties cooperating within the system are actively involved and taking account of the position of the persons to be protected and their experiences;

b. if necessary, the outcomes result in an amendment to the legislation and regulations governing Surveillance and Protection.