Hard landing after automatic approach Embraer 190, 1 October 2014
The human-machine interface of the Embraer 190 is designed in such a way that status information on autoflight modes is presented to the flight crew on their Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA). If, during an ILS automatic approach, the aeroplane is configured for a manual landing, the FMA displays APPR1 or APPR2. If the ILS automatic approach is to be followed by an automatic landing, the FMA displays AUTOLAND1. It is the flight crew’s task to set the intended landing mode and monitor whether this intended mode is actually armed/engaged.
During the ILS automatic approach, the flight crew were under the impression that they had configured the aeroplane for an automatic landing, while in reality they had configured the aeroplane for a manual landing. From the FMA, which (correctly) displayed APPR1, the flight crew might have drawn the conclusion that the aeroplane was not properly configured for their intended landing. However, they did not disengage the autopilot at or above the decision height. The result was a hard landing, leading to the operating rods of the left-hand main landing gear door and of the innermost right-hand flap being damaged. The accident did not result in personal injuries.
The DSB has no reason to believe there were any aeroplane technical issues that contributed to the accident, or that the aeroplane did not perform as intended, certified and approved. The focus of the report is on explaining why both pilots were incorrectly under the impression that they had configured the aircraft for an automatic landing.
Publication
Report
