



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

Mr. Tjibbe Joustra
Chairman
Dutch Safety Board
PO Box 95404
2509 CK The Hague
The Netherlands

Dear Mr. Joustra:

This is our final response to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety Recommendation 14.123 received on June 30, 2014. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) issued this recommendation following its investigation of an incident that occurred at Eindhoven Airport, the Netherlands. On May 31, 2013, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 was radar vectored to runway 21 for a landing with the aid of the instrument landing system. The aircraft was flying under instrument meteorological conditions. During the latter stage of the approach, the aircraft was above the intended three degree glide path. After the localizer was captured, a glide slope intercept from above caused a nose pitch increase of 24.5 degrees. The crew made a successful missed approach and landed successfully on the subsequent approach.

14.123. Assess the aviation Safety Management System occurrence reporting and analyses methodology, including the use of the existing ECCAIRS databases on the levels (operator, Air Navigation Service Provider, manufacturer, national-international level) whether measures are required to achieve the goal of the system to identify potential safety deficiencies in a timely manner. The review should also take into account: (a) the possibility to add internal investigation results into the ECCAIRS databases (feedback-loop), (b) the necessity to exchange investigation information with the manufacturer.

FAA Comment. As noted in our previous response, the FAA's Significant Safety Issue (SSI) identification process has been reviewed and briefed to the FAA Safety Management System Executive Council. The cross-organizational items submitted from each FAA line of business (LOB) SSI list have been prioritized using the FAA SSI identification process. When appropriate, a manufacturer can be involved as a stakeholder in a FAA safety analysis.

The FAA does not use European Coordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting, but utilizes many databases, including the Hazard Identification, Risk Management and Tracking (HIRMT) Tool. HIRMT became fully operational in March 2016 and is used to capture, manage, and report on safety issues across the FAA. HIRMT collects and tracks the results of analyses and risk assessments of identified safety issues and associated hazards. It enables FAA organizations to better communicate and collaborate with one another on those safety issues that

are most critical to the agency. The process is repeated annually, with modifications made to optimize the process using lessons learned in each reiteration.

I believe the FAA has effectively addressed this safety recommendation and consider our action complete.

The FAA would like to thank the Dutch Safety Board for submitting FAA Safety Recommendation 14.123 and its continued interest in aviation safety. If you have any questions, or need additional information regarding these safety recommendations, please contact the FAA Safety Recommendations Program staff at 9-AVP-FAA-SafetyRecs@faa.gov. Alternatively, you may contact Mr. Roberto Ingraio, AVP-420, at (202) 267-3887.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Michael J. O'Donnell", with a large, stylized flourish extending to the right.

Michael J. O'Donnell, A.A.E.
Director, Office of Accident Investigation
and Prevention